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The Changing Face of Pre-Operative Medical Disclosure: Placing the Patient at 
the Heart of the Matter* 
 
Abstract: Historically, the law of negligence has never fully embraced the notion of patient 
empowerment through the demanding of substantial pre-operative information.  In a dramatic volte 
face, this attitude has recently changed and as a consequence important headway has been made 
into redressing the imbalance of power between doctors and patients. The decision of the Supreme 
Court in Montgomery has arguably redefined the entire basis of the doctor-patient relationship in the 
eyes of the law, and it is against this backdrop that this article seeks to explore the changing 
landscape of consent and information disclosure. 
 
Introduction  
 
Up until recently, the law of negligence has never fully embraced the notion of patient 
empowerment through the demanding of substantial pre-operative information.  The paternalistic 
belief that “doctor knows best” was a historically embedded attitude within the practice of 
medicine.1  Whilst this view may no longer reflect the culture-shift that has taken place in medical 
thinking,2 English law traditionally endorsed the paternalistic attitudes associated with the medical 
profession and was inclined to show considerable deference to doctors when it came to judging 
their conduct.3  This was particularly the case in respect of assessing the provision of pre-operative 
information.4 
 For many years the leading House of Lords’ authority on the standard of disclosure in 
negligence was the confused judgment in Sidaway.5  Despite being difficult to understand, the 
ruling of their Lordships effectively allowed the medical profession itself to determine the adequacy 
of pre-operative disclosure, subject to the exception of where a substantial risk of grave and adverse 
                                                 
* 
1 For discussion see Raymond Tallis, Hippocratic Oaths: Medicine and its Discontents (London: Atlantic, 2004). 
 
2 See, for example, GMC, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (GMC, 2008); Margaret Brazier 
and José Miola, “Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?” (2000) 8 Medical Law Review 85. 
 
3 See Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582; Bolitho v City & Hackney Health 
Authority [1998] A.C. 232.  For a general discussion see Harvey Teff, Reasonable Care: Legal Perspectives on the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); Ian Kennedy, Treat me Right - Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988). 
 
4 See Michael Jones, “Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories” (1999) 7 Medical Law Review 103; Ian Kennedy, 
“The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus” (1984) 47 Modern Law Review 454; Margaret Brazier, “Patient Autonomy and 
Consent to Treatment: The Role of the Law?” (1987) 7 Legal Studies 169; Harvey Teff, “Consent to Medical 
Procedures: Paternalism, Self-Determination or Therapeutic Alliance?” (1985) 101 L.Q.R. 432. 
 
5 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and others [1985] A.C. 871.  See José Miola, “On the 
Materiality of Risk: Paper Tigers and Panaceas” (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 76.  
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consequences existed, in which case the obligation was on a doctor to disclose this regardless of the 
commonly accepted practice of the profession.6   
 The exercise of judging pre-operative disclosure therefore led off on the wrong foot by not 
placing at its core the position of the individual patient.7  The net effect was that doctors were not in 
any real sense obligated to divulge sufficient information to patients in order that they could make 
informed choices about their own healthcare decisions.   
 In a dramatic volte face, this attitude within the law of negligence has recently changed and 
as a consequence important headway has been made into redressing the imbalance of power 
between doctors and patients. The decision of the Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board (hereafter Montgomery) has arguably redefined the entire basis of the doctor-patient 
relationship in the eyes of the law, and it is against this backdrop that this article seeks to explore 
the changing landscape of consent and information disclosure.8  Our intention is not to re-examine 
the numerous debates concerning the different interpretations of the law which existed prior to the 
definitive ruling of the Supreme Court in Montgomery, for these have been analysed by others 
elsewhere.9  Nor is our intention to revisit many of the well-traversed arguments in favour of the 
decision in Montgomery. Rather, our aim is to consider the landscape of information disclosure law 
post-Montgomery, to analyse the potential impact of the decision and to consider the future 
direction of travel within the field. 
 Scottish in origin, from its inception in the Outer House of the Court of Session, to its 
passage through the Inner House, and its eventual hearing in the Supreme Court, Montgomery is a 
judgment not free from controversy.10  Our view is that their Lordships were almost certainly 
correct to take the opportunity to reshape the law, but some have questioned the potential 
                                                 
6 For critique, see Ian Kennedy, “The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus” (1984) 47 Modern Law Review 454.  See also 
the postscript note of the House of Lords’ decision in Ian Kennedy, Treat me Right - Essays in Medical Law and Ethics 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988). 
 
7 Early Court of Appeal applications of Sidaway interpreted the judgment in the most restrictive, paternalistic way 
possible.  See Gold v Haringey H.A. [1988] Q.B. 481; Blyth v Bloomsbury H.A. [1993] 4 Med L.R. 151 and José Miola, 
“On the Materiality of Risk: Paper Tigers and Panaceas” (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 76.  
 
8 [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] A.C. 1430. 
 
9 See Alasdair MacLean, “The Doctrine of Informed Consent: Does it Exist and Has it Crossed the Atlantic?” (2004) 24 
Legal Studies 386. 
 
10 See Rob Heywood, “Litigating Labour: Condoning Unreasonable Risk Taking in Childbirth?” (2015) 44 Common 
Law World Review 28; Rob Heywood, “Negligent Antenatal Disclosure and Management of Labour” (2011) 19 
Medical Law Review 140. 
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implications of doing so.11  We begin by turning our attention to the particulars of the decision, 
focusing on the refined standard of disclosure that was articulated by Lords Kerr and Reed.  We 
then attempt to locate the judgment within the framework of the changing complexion of medical 
law in a broader context.  From this point, the analysis proceeds to explore the state of the law post 
Montgomery, seeking to assess the extent to which judges in the lower courts have embraced the 
notion of patient-centred reasoning, before moving on to investigate some of the more uncertain 
aspects of the decision such as the subjective limb of the new test for disclosure, the need to discuss 
alternatives with patients, the difficulties associated with gauging patient comprehension and 
precise scope of the therapeutic privilege. The discussion then concentrates on assessing the 
potential influence of the judgment beyond the traditional information disclosure type claims.  
Finally, we conclude by offering some thoughts on the interplay between the law and professional 
ethics and make some tentative observations about the potential effect of Montgomery on the 
provision of healthcare in the future. 
 
Montgomery: The Decision 
 
In Montgomery the appellant sought damages on behalf of her son for the injuries he sustained 
during the course of childbirth. 12   The appellant alleged negligence against the consultant 
obstetrician responsible for her labour under two distinct grounds.  First, negligence was claimed 
regarding the antenatal care that was provided.  Second, the appellant made an accusation of 
negligence in the actual management of the labour.13   
 Our interest is predominantly related to the first ground in which the appellant argued that, 
prior to the birth, she ought to have been given advice about the risk of shoulder dystocia which 
would be involved in vaginal birth, and of the alternative means of delivery by caesarean section.  
This information was not provided to her and so she proceeded with a natural delivery in ignorance 
of the attendant risks and benefits inherent in each particular course of action.  A complicating 
factor was that the appellant suffered from diabetes, and it was agreed that the risk of shoulder 
                                                 
11 See Jonathan Montgomery and Elsa Montgomery, “Montgomery on Informed Consent: An Inexpert Decision?” 
(2016) 42 Journal of Medical Ethics 89.   
 
12 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] A.C. 1430.  
 
13 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] A.C. 1430 at [2]. 
Law Quarterly Review Revised Submission  Page 4 of 32 
dystocia in women with this condition was 9 - 10 per cent: more than for others.14  She claimed that 
had she been told of this risk she would have opted for a caesarean section.15   
 Lords Kerr and Reed held that a doctor is under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that 
the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any 
reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality was defined as whether, in the 
circumstances of a case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient 
would be likely to attach significance to it.16  This was subject to the therapeutic privilege, which 
entitles a doctor to withhold information from a patient if she reasonably considers that its 
disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health.17 Based on this position, the risk in 
Montgomery was held to be material and the appellant won her case. 
 
Locating Montgomery Within Medical Law 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Montgomery, both within medical law as a whole and the 
topic of informed consent, can be seen as an evolution rather than a revolution. In relation to the 
former, the decision of the House of Lords in Bolitho, where it was held that the courts did, after all, 
have the right to hold doctors negligent who nevertheless enjoyed the support of some colleagues 
for their actions – trite law for Tort lawyers but revolutionary for Medical Law – heralded a huge 
metamorphosis.18  Since that judgment in 1997, the discipline of medical law has performed the 
ultimate transformation and has ceased to focus on duties of doctors, but has instead prioritised 
patients’ rights.  The ‘old’ medical law placed doctors at the heart of proceedings at the expense of 
patients.  As Sheila McLean noted: 
“No matter the quality of medicine practised, and no matter the doubts of doctors themselves 
about the appropriateness of their involvement, human life is increasingly medicalised.  In 
part, this is the result of the growing professionalism of medicine, in part our responsibility 
for asking too much of doctors.  In part, however, it is also because the buffer which might be 
expected to stand between medicalisation and human rights - namely the law - has proved 
                                                 
14 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] A.C. 1430 at [13]. 
 
15 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] A.C. 1430 at [18]. 
 
16 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] A.C. 1430 at [87]. 
 
17 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] A.C. 1430 at [88]. 
 
18 Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] A.C. 232. See José Miola “Moralising Medicine: ‘Proper Medical 
Treatment’ and the Role of Ethics and Law in Medical Decision-Making”, in Sara Fovargue and Alex Mullock, The 
Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the Medical Exception? (London: Routledge, 2016). 
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unwilling, unable or inefficient when asked to adjudicate on or control issues which are at 
best tangentially medical.”19 
 
More recently, as we demonstrate below, we have seen both case law and legislation that place the 
patient at the very heart of the legal landscape.  From McLean’s apocalyptic vision we have gone to 
this: 
“the discipline of healthcare law is at risk of being transformed – moving from a discipline in 
which the moral values of medical ethics (and those of the non-medical health professions) 
are a central concern, to one in which they are being supplanted by an amoral commitment to 
choice and consumerism.”20 
 
How did we get here? Most notably, Medical Law as a whole has undergone a process of de-
Bolamisation.21  Previously, that test for negligence was ubiquitous and strayed way beyond matters 
of technical medical expertise – it was used to determine how to make decisions for adults who 
lacked capacity, how much information to provide to patients and how to treat minors.22  This was 
necessarily doctor-facing, the starting point for the law being the question of what the reasonable 
doctor would do in the circumstances. However, Bolam is in retreat, not just within the common 
law in issues such as risk disclosure, but also in terms of recent legislation.  The Mental Capacity 
Act 2005, for example, lays out a statutory framework for adults who lack capacity that contains 
significant elements of substituted judgement and mechanisms whereby people can make decisions 
about their treatment that are binding if they lose capacity.23  Equally the Human Tissue Act 2004, 
which governs the removal, storage and use of human organs and tissue, has consent at its very 
core.24  In all cases the driving force for change has been an increased recognition of the principle 
                                                 
19 Shelia McLean, Old Law New Medicine: Modern Medical Ethics and Human Rights (London: Pandora, 1998) at p.2. 
 
20 Jonathan Montgomery, “Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine” (2006) 26 Legal Studies 185 at 186. 
 
21 José Miola, “Bolam: Medical Law’s Accordion” in Jonathan Herring and Jesse Wall, Landmark Cases in Medical 
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2015). 
 
22 Margaret Brazier and José Miola, “Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?” (2000) 8 Medical Law 
Review 85 
 
23 See Rob Heywood, “Revisiting Advance Decision Making Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005: A Tale of Mixed 
Messages” (2015) 23 Medical Law Review 81; Mary Donnelly, “Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005” (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 1. 
 
24 Kathleen Liddell and Alison Hall, “Beyond Bristol and Alder Hey: the Future Regulation of Human Tissue” (2005) 
13 Medical Law Review 170. 
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of autonomy, and a desire to protect it.25  The starting point for the law has now become: what has 
the patient a right to?  The new mantra is patient choice.26 
 As mentioned above, the issue of risk disclosure has been a part of this shift, and indeed is 
an excellent exemplar.  The law has, since the 1980s, developed from requiring that the doctor must 
provide the patient with information that the reasonable doctor would give, without the possibility 
of judicial oversight,27 to stating that that the test remained that of the reasonable doctor, but this 
time with judicial oversight,28 and then to a test where the doctor must disclose everything that the 
reasonable patient would want to be informed of.29  The new test in Montgomery is merely another 
step along that path, and has merely continued the law along the same trajectory through which it 
has been travelling for some time.  This development was therefore somewhat predictable,30 and 
simply constituted the first time the Supreme Court had had the opportunity to get its teeth into the 
issue of the materiality of risk since the 1980s. 
We must, therefore, see the decision of the Supreme Court in Montgomery for what it is: a 
continuation of both the journey that medical law has been embarking on in general terms, and that 
risk disclosure has been at the vanguard of.  It is therefore a natural and predicted evolution of the 
law. It is not an unexpected, revolutionary judgment that has suddenly changed the face of medical 
law – although we do argue in our final section that parts of it open the door for more rapid change 
in the future.  The focus of our article is not on the judgment itself; that has already been well 
covered by others.31  Rather, having already briefly considering the decision of the Supreme Court, 
we now concentrate on looking at the effect that Montgomery might have, principally on 
information disclosure, but also on medical law as a whole in the future. 
 
                                                 
25 José Miola “Moralising Medicine: ‘Proper Medical Treatment’ and the Role of Ethics and Law in Medical Decision-
Making”, in Sara Fovargue and Alex Mullock, The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the Medical 
Exception? (London: Routledge, 2016). 
 
26 Jonathan Montgomery, “Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine” (2006) 26 Legal Studies 185. 
 
27 Gold v Haringey H.A. [1987] 2 All E.R. 888 ;  Blyth v Bloomsbury [1993] 4 Med. L.R. 151. 
 
28 Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Med. L.R. 334 
 
29 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] P.IQ.R. 53; Wyatt v Curtis [2003] EWCA Civ 1779; [2003] All 
E.R. (D) 493. 
 
30 José Miola, “On the Materiality of Risk: Paper Tigers and Panaceas” (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 76. 
 
31 Roderick Bagshaw “Modernising the Doctor's Duty to Disclose Risks of Treatment” (2016) 182 L.Q.R. 132; Clark 
Hobson “No (,) More Bolam Please: Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board” (2016) 79 Modern Law Review 488; 
Rob Heywood, “R.I.P. Sidaway: Patient-Oriented Disclosure – A Standard Worth Waiting For?” (2015) 23 Medical 
Law Review 455. 
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Embracing Patient-Oriented Reasoning?  
 
The benefit of the standard of disclosure endorsed in Montgomery is that it has reoriented the 
starting point of the investigation into the adequacy of medical information.  Instead of examining 
matters from the perspective of what doctors think that patients should reasonably be told, the 
principal line of legal inquiry is now dominated by what judges think patients should be entitled to 
(or indeed what the doctor knows or ought to know that that patient herself would want to know 
about).  The strong message in the wake of Montgomery is that the wants, needs and reasonably 
held expectations of patients ought to now occupy a position at the apex of judicial reasoning.  An 
interesting question, then, is whether or not this message has been received and interpreted in the 
manner in which it was intended. 
 It is already clear that the ruling in Montgomery is having an impact, and some statements of 
claim have evidently been amended in order to take account of the decision.32  However, since the 
decision, there has been a rather varied approach from judges in the lower courts in terms of the 
precise weight that they have been prepared to place on considerations pertaining to the interests of 
patients.   
 Thus in FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust33 the allegation once again centred on the failure 
to inform an expectant mother about the risk of shoulder dystocia in her third pregnancy.  Her first 
son was born naturally, albeit after a long and painful labour.  During the birth of her second son, 
despite the mother believing that it was a successful natural birth, there was evidence that a 
moderate degree of shoulder dystocia had actually occurred.34  She was not informed about this and 
it was admitted by the defendant that she should have been.35  Had she been informed about these 
complications in her previous natural delivery, she would have alerted the midwife to this during 
her later pregnancy; and this would have altered the course of her care as an occurrence of shoulder 
dystocia in an earlier vaginal delivery increases the risk factor in a later delivery.36  The defendant 
Trust therefore admitted that there ought to have been a discussion about the mode of delivery prior 
to the onset of labour, and that this did not happen.37  It was contended, however, that had the 
                                                 
32 Jones v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 2154. 
 
33 [2015] EWHC 775. 
 
34 FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 775 at [23]. 
 
35 FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 775 at [9]. 
 
36 FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 775. 
 
37 FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 775. 
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conversation taken place it would not have altered anything. The mother would still have been 
advised to attempt a natural delivery and she would have agreed to do so. Accordingly her son 
would have been injured in any event and the claim should fail on causation.  Whilst the case did 
not rest on an assessment of the magnitude of the risk for the purposes of assessing the question of 
breach, some interesting observations can be made about how McKenna J assessed the potential 
impact that the knowledge of the risk may have had on any subsequent decision taken by the 
mother. 
 It was submitted on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the evidence did not disclose any 
objective reasons why the mother would have opted for a caesarean section in the circumstances 
where a majority of women would not.38  This was always going to be a dangerous position to 
adopt, as the test for ascertaining causation in medical disclosure cases has never been wholly 
objective and has employed a hybrid subjective/objective approach to answering the hypothetical 
question regarding what the patient would have done had they been told about the risk.39  What is 
interesting here, though, is the emphasis that was placed on the subjective view of that risk in 
relation to the individual patient.  Careful reasoning by McKenna J led to the conclusion that, whilst 
the disclosure of this risk may not have altered the final decision made by the majority of patients, it 
would have affected what this mother would have done.40  For FM, it was the identification of the 
risk that was paramount and not the quantification of it.41  Moreover, the significant trauma that she 
had experienced in giving birth to her first son would have caused her to want to avoid a similar 
situation in future.  This, coupled with the information that she should have been given in relation to 
the previously experienced shoulder dystocia during the birth of her second son, and an increase in 
risk of the same thing happening due to the potential size of her baby during her third pregnancy, on 
balance, would have tipped the scales in favour of her deciding upon delivery via a caesarean 
section. 42   Placing the mother at the heart of his reasoning and considering her individual 
circumstances in totality allowed McKenna J to find in favour of the claimant, when, objectively 
assessed, a similar decision may not have been reached.  From the perspective of patient rights the 
decision ought to be well received, yet the extent to which the reasoning was influenced by 
                                                 
38 FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 775 at [62]. 
 
39 See Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Health Authority [1994] 5 Med. L.R. 285. 
 
40 FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 775 at [66]. 
 
41 FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 775 at [67]. 
 
42FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 775 at [68]. 
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Montgomery is questionable given that the decision of the Supreme Court was only handed down 
during the course of the trial.43  Indeed, it might have been an indication that the lower courts were 
already of a similar mind to that of the Supreme Court.  Nonetheless there have subsequently been 
cases in which Montgomery has been considered to a greater extent, but which have yielded a rather 
different result. 
 In A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust44  the claimant sought to 
recover damages for the costs that she had suffered as a result of the birth of her child. The first 
issue in the case was whether, during a number of consultations before the birth, there was evidence 
from which it could be deduced that there was a material risk that Mrs A’s child would have been 
suffering from a chromosomal abnormality. 45   The second was whether, had this risk been 
communicated, the claimant would have requested an amniocentesis.46  She was effectively arguing 
that had she been informed of the potential risk of a chromosomal abnormality she would have 
requested an amniocentesis, which would have detected the problem. This, in turn, would have 
caused her to request a termination.47  It was held by Dingemans J that there was no evidence to 
support the fact that the risk of a chromosomal abnormality was in fact a material risk.  It was also 
found that, even if the claimant had have been informed about the risk, she would not then have 
opted to undergo an amniocentesis and, finally, it was concluded that she would have not requested 
a termination in any event.48   
 The categorisation of the risk of a chromosomal abnormality as not being material did not 
seem a natural corollary of the expansive view espoused by the Supreme Court in Montgomery.  
The risk was only slight - around 1 in 1,000 - and this led Dingemans J to the conclusion that it was 
a “theoretical, negligible, or background” risk.49  His view of the decision in Montgomery was that, 
whilst it affirmed the importance of patient autonomy, it was “not authority for the proposition that 
medical practitioners need to warn about risks which are theoretical and not material”. 50   In 
                                                 
43 FM v Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 775 at [20]. 
 
44 [2015] EWHC 1038. 
 
45 A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038 at [4]. 
 
46 A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038 at [5]. 
 
47 A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038. 
 
48 A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038 at [119]–[120]. 
 
49 A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038 at [84]. 
 
50 A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038 at [90]. 
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principle there is nothing inaccurate about this, but the judge’s conclusion that the risk was merely 
theoretical seemed largely based on an objective assessment of its rate of occurrence, with very 
little attention being paid to the severity of consequence and the potential importance that the 
particular patient would have attached to it – precisely the issues that led the High Court of 
Australia to declare a much smaller risk (1 in 14,000 of sympathetic ophthalmia) material in Rogers 
v Whitaker (discussed below), whose test was adopted by Montgomery.  In placing emphasis on the 
rate of occurrence, it was always going to be difficult to suggest that the risk in question was 
material.  However, it was made clear in Montgomery that disclosure was not to be dictated solely 
by recourse to percentages, nor was it limited to a purely objective assessment of what a reasonable 
patient may consider material.51  In A v East Kent there was at least some attempt to consider the 
risk from the perspective of the patient by the judge, but it is here where his analysis becomes 
questionable.   
 Dingemans J concluded that because the mother had submitted herself to testing for Down’s 
syndrome at an earlier stage in the pregnancy, and that as this had returned a finding that she was at 
risk within the margin of 1:1753, that she was prepared to accept certain “background” risks in the 
pregnancy.  Therefore, following the same line of reasoning, as she had been willing to live with the 
slight risk of Down’s syndrome, she would have also considered the risk of a chromosomal 
abnormality to be nothing more than in the background and would have been willing to accept that 
too. 52   This misses the bigger picture and exposes a narrow perspective on patient-oriented 
reasoning.   
 The only reason that the mother could classify the risk of Down’s syndrome as a 
“background” risk is because she had been tested and subsequently notified of the result.  It is 
impossible to conclude with any degree of certainty that the mother would have also classified the 
risk of a chromosomal defect as being only a background risk when she was never given the option 
of submitting to the test that would have clarified what the risk factor actually was. What is certain, 
however, is that she was clearly concerned about having a disabled baby, evidenced by the very 
fact that she agreed to undergo tests to identify the risks of Down’s syndrome in the first place.  
Thus, it seems evident that the risk of a chromosomal abnormality may well have operated on her 
mind and at the very least she ought to have been offered information about it in order that she 
could gauge the significance of it for herself.  She may well then have continued to decline the 
amniocentesis, but that would have been her choice and one that she could only have made 
                                                 
51 See Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] A.C. 1430 at [89]. 
 
52 A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038 at [62]-[89]. 
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effectively in command of the necessary information about the respective risks and benefits of the 
amniocentesis test itself, compared to the risks and benefits of identifying the chromosomal 
defect.53  Thus, had Dingemans J positioned the patient at the forefront of his reasoning, he could 
arguably have reached a different view, which would have seemed more in line with the patient-
oriented approach adopted in Montgomery. It is therefore apparent that there is some indication of 
Montgomery having a varied impact in terms of childbirth litigation per se, but equally it is clear 
that there are also wider issues that have been left open.  It is to some of these unanswered questions 
that we now turn our attention.   
 
Information Disclosure: The Unanswered Questions 
 
A. Disclosure from a Land Down Under: Australian Law Post-Rogers and How it Might 
Develop Here  
 
One of the headline issues in the decision of the Supreme Court is, of course, that the English courts 
have finally formally adopted the Australian approach to the materiality of risk.  The court 
explicitly stated that the test for materiality in England and Wales is now to be that in the High 
Court of Australia (HCA) decision in Rogers v Whitaker.54  In Rogers, the HCA broke away from 
Bolam and English law as it was at the time, on the grounds that the purpose of the law was to 
protect patient autonomy and Bolam was an inappropriate mechanism for achieving this aim.55  The 
court also provided a new definition of the materiality of risk: 
 
“A risk is material if in the circumstances of the particular case a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position if warned of the risk would be likely to attach significance to it; or if the 
medical practitioner is, or should reasonably be aware, that the particular patient, if warned of 
the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it”.56  
 
It is certainly very different from Bolam’s reasonable doctor standard of disclosure, yet it is what 
the Supreme Court has now endorsed in England.  Given this, it is therefore worth looking at the 
test itself in more detail, as well as examining how it has fared in Australia.  We begin with the 
                                                 
53 It was stated that an amniocentesis carried a 1 in 100 risk of provoking a premature delivery and that such a 
premature birth would have created a significant risk of disability to the resultant child.  A v East Kent Hospitals 
University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038 at [113]. 
 
54 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479. 
 
55 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479 at 489. 
 
56 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479 at 490. 
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second point, because it is an easy one to answer.  In short, Australian law has persisted with the 
test in Rogers, which remains good law.  It received an early test in the form of the case of 
Rosenberg v Percival, where the High Court of Australia was asked to reconsider the decision in 
Rogers.57  Rogers passed with flying colours, and was reaffirmed.58  The concerns of the Australian 
medical profession were squarely confronted,59 and it was made clear that Rogers was there to 
stay.60  It has not been seriously questioned since.  We would add a caveat that one effect has been 
to encourage the law relating to causation to be tightened again – and we return to that below.  For 
the moment, however, we consider to the question of how the test itself might be satisfied.  
 There are two parts to the test in Rogers (and now, of course, Montgomery).  The first is 
objective, stating that a risk is material if the reasonable patient in the patient’s position would want 
to be told of it.  The difficulty with this part of the test is italicised: what does “in the patient’s 
position” mean?  This is something that has been under-considered both in the literature and case 
law.61  However, what information there is suggests that the courts look primarily at physical 
factors.62  Maree Whitaker having only one eye, for example, was something that was included 
under this category by the court in Rogers.  The patient’s personal views, as well as her 
eccentricities and religious views, on the other hand, are catered for by the second, subjective arm 
of the test, which requires the doctor to disclose information that the doctor knows or ought to know 
that that particular patient would want to be informed of.  Although the court in Rosenberg 
interpreted Rogers as stating that situations where a doctor “ought to know” that a patient would 
have wanted to be informed of a certain piece of information would not be limited to where she asks 
questions,63 it is difficult to see how else a doctor might be found liable for something that she was 
not told.64 
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58 Rosenberg v Percival [2000] 205 C.L.R. 434. See, for example, [14] (per Gleeson CJ) and [75]-[82] (per Gummow 
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64 This assumes that, for example, the information is in the patient’s notes and the doctor has not read them or that the 
information was otherwise available in a place that the doctor should have seen. 
 
Law Quarterly Review Revised Submission  Page 13 of 32 
 Yet the Australian courts have stuck with Rogers.  That is not to say that they have failed to 
recognise the significant shift that it represents, nor indeed that they have not attempted to mitigate 
its effect in other ways.  Rather, they have sought to do exactly this by partially reversing their 
previously generous stance on causation in the recent case of Wallace v Kam.65  It has been argued 
that the decision in Wallace can be directly attributed to the desire of the Australian courts not to 
stack the deck too heavily in favour of claimants in informed consent cases.66  The facts of the case 
are somewhat quirky, but can be dealt with briefly.  Mr Wallace, the claimant, was offered spinal 
surgery that carried inherent risks including a one in twenty chance of permanent paralysis and 
bilateral femoral neurapraxia, a temporary, localised nerve damage to the thighs.  He was not 
informed of either risk, but the neurapraxia materialised despite the operation being performed 
properly.  Both of the risks were considered to be material, and should thus have been disclosed.  
The problem for Mr Wallace was causation.  This was because he admitted that, had he been 
informed of the risk of neurapraxia, he would have consented to the procedure anyway, but he 
would have not have had the procedure had he been informed of the risk of paralysis.  Thus, had he 
been informed of all material risks he would not have undergone the procedure, but he would still 
have consented had he been informed only of the risk that materialised.  The High Court of 
Australia thus had a choice to make: it could either protect Mr Wallace’s right to autonomy and 
interpret causation widely, or it could interpret causation narrowly and deny his claim.  As the High 
Court stated, in a joint judgment: 
 
“The argument in favour of … [the claimant] to that question … is that it aligns the scope of 
Dr Kam's liability with the scope of the duty that Dr Kam (on the facts found and assumed) 
has breached … The risk that came home to Mr Wallace was a risk of which Dr Kam had a 
duty to warn Mr Wallace and of which, in breach of that duty, Dr Kam failed to warn Mr 
Wallace. The imposition of liability in such a case would reinforce the duty, which Dr Kam 
would otherwise have breached with impunity to the detriment of Mr Wallace. It would 
compensate Mr Wallace for the coming home of a risk which was amongst those of which he 
should have been warned and which he would not in fact have borne had Dr Kam discharged 
his duty. 
 
The argument in favour of … [the defendant] can be expressed somewhat glibly in the 
proposition that Mr Wallace should not be compensated for the materialisation of a risk he 
would have been prepared to accept.  … [T]he ultimately persuasive force of that proposition 
lies not in its intuitive attraction but in recognition of the distinct nature of the material risks 
about which Dr Kam failed to warn Mr Wallace and in relating Mr Wallace's acceptance of 
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66 See Tracey Carver and Malcolm Smith, “Medical Negligence, Causation and Liability for Non-Disclosure of Risk: A 
Post-Wallace Framework and Critique” (2014) 37 University of New South Wales Law Review 972, at 1001. 
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the risk that came home to the policy underlying Dr Kam's duty to warn Mr Wallace of all 
material risks”.67 
 
The High Court unanimously decided against Mr Wallace, and treated the duty to warn of the 
neurapraxia and paralysis as distinct rather than joint.  The question for the court thus became: 
“would Mr Wallace have consented to the procedure had he been informed of the risk of 
neurapraxia?” rather than “would Mr Wallace have consented to the procedure had he been 
informed of all material risks?”.  His claim therefore failed because he was willing to run the risk of 
neurapraxia.68  This case can only be seen as being inconsistent with the approach previously taken 
by the High Court of Australia in the case of Chappel v Hart.69  In that case the Court held that what 
was important was the patient’s right to choose, and that the law should seek to uphold that.70  Yet 
in Wallace the Court was clear that Dr Kam was not liable “for impairment of Mr Wallace’s right to 
choose whether or not to undergo the surgical procedure”.71  
 It should be noted, however, that this was very much a policy decision.72  This is evident 
from the somewhat baffling citation in Wallace of the English House of Lords decision in Chester v 
Afshar in support of the proposition that: 
 
“[t]he duty to inform the patient of inherent material risks is imposed to enable the patient to 
choose whether or not to run those inherent risks and thereby "to avoid the occurrence of the 
particular physical injury the risk of which [the] patient is not prepared to accept”.73  
 
This is far removed from Lord Steyn’s intention in Chester when one considers the referenced 
paragraph as a whole.  Indeed, the quoted portion with the preceding and following sentences 
reveals rather a different meaning: 
 
                                                 
67 Wallace v Kam [2013] H.C.A. 19 at [31]-[32]. 
 
68 Wallace v Kam [2013] H.C.A. 19 at [37]-[39]. 
 
69 (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232. 
 
70 See Tony Honoré, “Medical Non-Disclosure, Causation and Risk: Chappel v Hart” (1999) 7 Torts Law Journal 1.  A 
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71 Wallace v Kam [2013] H.C.A. 19 at [39]. See also [9]. 
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“A rule requiring a doctor to abstain from performing an operation without the informed 
consent of a patient serves two purposes. It tends to avoid the occurrence of the particular 
physical injury the risk of which a patient is not prepared to accept. It also ensures that due 
respect is given to the autonomy and dignity of each patient”.74 
 
In fact, Carver and Smith argue that the decision in Chester (which is itself based on the Australian 
decision in Chappel) and English law in general provide “greater prioritisation of patient 
autonomy” than Australian law post-Wallace.75  This was before Montgomery.  Equally, Farrell and 
Brazier have argued that the decision in Wallace can be understood as causation being used as a 
“control mechanism” to limit claimants’ chances of success following Rogers.76  The question is: 
can Chester survive Montgomery in a way that Chappel could not ultimately survive Rogers 
(despite being decided later)?  An intriguing aspect to Montgomery lies in an explicit refusal to 
engage with the question of whether, had Mrs Montgomery said that she would not have requested 
a caesarean if informed of the risk of should dystocia, the Supreme Court would still have found for 
her.  The last substantive sentence in the judgment of Lords Reed and Kerr is quite unequivocal: 
“It is unnecessary in these circumstances to consider whether, if Mrs Montgomery could not 
establish “but for” causation, she might nevertheless establish causation on some other basis 
in the light of Chester v Afshar”.77 
It would seem to us that the Supreme Court has left the door open to a tightening of the rules of 
causation similar to that in Wallace, depending on the effect that Montgomery has on the lower 
courts.  As in Australia, the move to a particular patient standard of disclosure may not constitute 
the end of the story. 
 
B. Alternative Treatments  
 
The decision in Montgomery itself is also somewhat short on detail regarding the requirement that 
doctors disclose alternative treatments.  That they must be disclosed to the patient is not in doubt – 
and the Supreme Court made this very clear when it defined what the doctor’s duty entailed: 
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“The doctor is … under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of 
any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative 
or variant treatments”.78 
Moreover, it was not the only mention by Lords Reed and Kerr of the existence such a duty, which 
has been acknowledged by the law as far back as Sidaway.79  Yet there is  little in the way of 
guidance regarding what the duty might actually entail.  As the quote above demonstrates, the 
disclosure of alternatives relates to both alternative and variant treatments.  However, it is limited to 
reasonable alternatives and variants.  The key, of course, lies in determining what constitutes 
reasonableness, and how it is to be assessed.  To this end, it is disappointing that the Supreme Court 
did not discuss the decision in Birch, which considered this duty, or, for that matter, the more recent 
decision in Meiklejohn.80  In our view the law would have benefitted from some guidance in 
relation to this issue.  
 Birch concerned a patient who suffered a stroke after a cerebral catheter angiogram was 
performed.  This was a small but inherent risk in the procedure, and the patient was not informed of 
an alternative (in the form of a MRI scan) what might produce a less exact result but carried no risk 
of a stroke.81  One of the issues before Cranston J was whether the MRI, as an alternative, should 
have been disclosed.  While, in our view, not being as clear as he might have been regarding how 
reasonableness might be determined, there are some principles that we can take from the case.  
First, the duty was to warn of comparative risks, and a significant part of that was the fact that the 
MRI was a less risky procedure than the angiogram.82  In other words, an alternative is more likely 
to be “reasonable” if it is less risky than the proposed procedure.  Another aspect of reasonableness 
rested on the fact that another doctor was suggesting the MRI.83  This means that a duty to warn of 
reasonable alternatives includes a duty to warn of different procedures recommended by different 
doctors, or at least explain that different doctors might approach the same problem differently.  
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Finally, Cranston J was clear regarding the purpose of this duty: it was to prevent the patient being 
“denied the opportunity to make an informed choice”. 84   Overall, the decision would seem 
consistent with that in Montgomery: the decision is the patient’s to make, and the information that 
should be made available to the patient must therefore be consistent with that purpose.  
Disagreements among doctors, and less risky procedures, would be pieces of information that 
patients would want to be told, and this therefore forms part of the duty.  Nevertheless, the same 
cannot be said of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mieklejohn.85  
 In this case the court made a distinction between alternative treatments and procedures (as in 
Birch) and alternative diagnoses.  The facts and the claim are complex, but only need be rehearsed 
in skeleton form here.  At issue was a diagnosis made by the defendant that the claimant had 
acquired rather than inherited aplastic anaemia (AA), or another inherited bone marrow failure 
syndrome (IBFMS) such as Fanconi’s or Dyskeratosis Congenita (DC).  The diagnosis of acquired 
AA led to treatment with a drug that carried a risk of avascular necrosis as a side effect, and the risk 
materialised.  One aspect of the claimant’s case was that the defendant doctor should have informed 
him of the alternative diagnoses, and therefore of alternative treatments.  As this information was 
not provided there was a breach of duty, according to the claimant, and following the decision in 
Chester “causation should follow to give purpose to the breach”.86  It must be said that we agree 
with Rafferty LJ, delivering the only substantive judgment, that the claimant’s argument is weak.  
The contention that the chance of any IBFMS was 10% and DC only 2-3%, and that these 
alternative diagnoses should have been disclosed merely because these numbers were higher than 
those in Sidaway, Chester and Birch, seems simplistic at best.87  
 However, one other point merits further comment here: the way in which the Court of 
Appeal envisioned the legal landscape, in particular Chester and Birch.  Our view is that the Court 
of Appeal’s description of both cases was rather dismissive.  Rafferty LJ interpreted the decision in 
Chester as follows: 
 
“All five of their Lordships concluded that she failed on causation since the surgeon's breach 
of duty had not increased the risk of her suffering the complication but three thought public 
policy merited an exception to traditional rules on causation.  Chester is at best a modest 
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acknowledgement, couched in terms of policy, of narrow facts far from analogous to those we 
are considering. Reference to it does not advance the case for the Claimant since I cannot 
identify within it any decision of principle”.88 
 
We certainly do not recognise the House of Lords in Chester as finding that Mrs Chester “failed on 
causation”, and we also fundamentally disagree that the case does not involve a “decision of 
principle”.  We would argue quite the opposite, particularly regarding the second point, and we 
would not be alone in doing so.89  Birch is also given short shrift, with the Court of Appeal 
describing it thus: 
 
“… this was a first instance decision, and was not about comparative diagnoses and the risks 
of different treatments but about the failure to inform of alternative investigations and their 
risks. I am not sure how much if at all it contributes to the learning necessary to reach a 
conclusion in this very different case. I have not found it useful”.90 
 
The marginalisation of these two cases by the court in Miekljohn is surely incompatible with the 
views expressed in Montgomery.  The distinction between warning of alternative diagnoses, 
treatments and investigations is rather specious.  If the law relating to information disclosure is 
about allowing patients to make their own decisions based on all of the relevant information – as 
Montgomery provides – then surely a potential alternative diagnosis, the existence of which may 
affect the patient’s decision, would be information relevant to the patient’s ability to make the 
choice that she wants to make.  Moreover, one detail of the case focuses on an alternative treatment 
for DC, which is also the treatment for AA (the drug Oxymetholone).  Had the claimant been 
advised of this, and the alternative diagnosis, we do not believe that it would be unreasonable to ask 
whether that information might have caused him to at least discuss with the doctor the possibility of 
“hedging his bets” and to ask to be treated with Oxymetholone. In our view, this was certainly 
information that would have affected the patient’s decision, and therefore his ability to make an 
autonomous choice.  Given this, we cannot endorse the judge’s distinguishing of Birch on this 
basis.  
Moreover, both Chester and Birch are about autonomy in a broad sense, yet in Mieklejohn 
Rafferty LJ interprets them narrowly, confining them to their facts.  In terms of the case before her, 
she held that even if the doctor had warned of the alternative diagnoses (which she said was not 
required as Birch was distinguished), Mr Mieklejohn would have been recommended the same 
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treatment as he was, and would have consented to it.  There was thus no causation, and the claimant 
would fail to prove negligence.  What we can see, then, is again an aspect of the law, unexplored in 
Montgomery, which is not currently as settled as we might think that it would or, indeed, should be.  
The next section concerns patient understanding, where gaps also remain. 
 
C. Patient Comprehension  
 
What steps a doctor must take to ensure that the execution of her communication with the patient is 
reasonable is a very under-considered area of the law.91  Before Montgomery, the only case to 
confront the issue directly was Al Hamwi v Johnson and Another.92  In that case the patient sought 
amniocentesis intending to terminate the pregnancy if Down’s Syndrome was discovered.  She 
spoke little English, and was provided with a translator.  The details of what was said at the 
counselling session with the defendant are disputed, but Mrs Al Hamwi left the meeting believing 
that amniocentesis carried a 75% chance of harming the foetus (the true figure being in the region 
of 1%), and declined to undergo the test.  The baby was born with a genetic malformation and Mrs 
Al Hamwi sued, stating that the communication of risks had been negligent.  She had been provided 
with leaflets and an interpreter, and the counsellor insisted that she had given the same information 
that she would to anyone.  For our purposes, however, what is important is how the court saw the 
doctor’s duty to adequately disclose information.  The judge held that the doctor’s disclosure must 
be reasonable, but stressed that it would be too great a step to require medical professionals to 
ensure understanding.93 
 The problem was that he did not elaborate on what the doctor’s obligation actually was.  In 
Mrs Al Hamwi’s case, there had clearly been at the very least a significant misunderstanding.  Can 
we extrapolate from the judgment that no duty to ensure understanding means that there is no duty 
to check?  A complicating factor was the counsellor’s strong religious beliefs and writing in 
Christian textbooks that amniocentesis be discouraged as it was a precursor to abortion.  Might a 
medical professional with an interest in one or other decision being made be less likely to check that 
the patient has fully understood if she feels that the misunderstanding has been felicitous?  None of 
this was discussed in Al Hamwi, and what we are left with is a judgment that tells us what a doctor 
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does not have to do, without ever spelling out what her positive obligations are or how we would 
test whether they had been met. 
Given this, we would have hoped that the Supreme Court in Montgomery might have provided 
some guidance.  Unfortunately, this was not the case.  There is only one reference in Montgomery to 
the adequacy of the communication of the information, when Lords Reed and Kerr held that: 
“the doctor’s advisory role involves dialogue, the aim of which is to ensure that the patient 
understands the seriousness of her condition, and the anticipated benefits and risks of the 
proposed treatment and any reasonable alternatives, so that she is then in a position to make 
an informed decision. This role will only be performed effectively if the information provided 
is comprehensible. The doctor’s duty is not therefore fulfilled by bombarding the patient with 
technical information which she cannot reasonably be expected to grasp, let alone by 
routinely demanding her signature on a consent form”.94 
Like the court in Al Hamwi, this is guidance on what the doctor’s duty does not consist of, but less 
regarding what is required.  The reference to dialogue may well be a reference to the GMC’s 
guidance.95  This was quoted with approval by the court in Montgomery,96 and Lords Reed and Kerr 
also stated that their new test for materiality was not unrealistic because what it demands is already 
required by the GMC.97  Nevertheless, they were less forthcoming in determining just what the 
doctor must actually do to discharge her duty of care.  In particular, there is no mention at all 
regarding the mechanics of any communication: must interpreters always be used?  Is providing 
leaflets enough? Should doctors try to persuade their patients that a certain choice is correct?  How 
far must they go in ensuring understanding, and what practical steps should they take?  All of these 
remain live issues despite the decision of the Supreme Court.  The most that can be said is that the 
philosophy behind the decision in Montgomery has, albeit implicitly, overruled the decision in Al 
Hamwi. 
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D. The Scope of the Therapeutic Privilege 
 
The extent to which clinical judgment may still be exercised in pre-operative disclosure is difficult 
to ascertain.  In Montgomery, the existence of the therapeutic privilege was recognised.  A doctor is 
thus entitled to withhold information from a patient if she reasonably considers that its disclosure 
would be detrimental to a patient’s health.98  A measure of clinical discretion is still afforded to 
healthcare professionals in terms of what they are required to divulge in certain circumstances.  
However, the precise boundaries placed on the therapeutic privilege are obscure and challenging to 
define, principally because it is difficult to identify any cases in which it has been successfully 
relied upon in this country.99  Furthermore, interpretational ambiguities surround the notions of 
“detrimental” and “patient’s health”.100  In dealing with the latter first, the patient’s health ought to 
be interpreted in an expansive way and encompass both physical and mental health, which would 
account for the fact that patients could be affected in different ways by excessive information. 
Nonetheless, the former concept is more ambiguous.  “Detrimental”, it would seem, means being 
capable of causing some type of substantial harm to the patient beyond merely triggering the 
ordinary emotions that many patients will experience prior to surgery.  A doctor must demonstrate 
that the provision of the information would cause a greater type of harm to the patient’s health than 
the mere onset of anxiety, nerves and stress.  It would also seem that the doctor must prove that the 
information would have been detrimental to that particular patient and not attempt to justify the 
withholding of information based on the fact that it would adversely affect the wider population of 
patients in general.  By way of example, the consultant’s argument in Montgomery that disclosure 
of the risk of shoulder dystocia would not be in maternal interests in general was not, in itself, a 
strong enough justification for reliance on the therapeutic privilege.101 
 With the therapeutic privilege being so closely aligned to the position of the individual 
patient, the benefits of the subjective limb to the standard of disclosure become apparent.  The 
therapeutic privilege is sometimes referred to as a defence, but that is misleading as it does not 
operate in the same way as other traditional defences to negligence.  It is a component part of the 
test for ascertaining a breach of duty.  The correct legal position is that the presumption ought to be 
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one of disclosure, and it is then for the doctor to prove, on the balance of probabilities, why she felt 
non-disclosure was justified in the circumstances. If she can do this, there is simply no breach.  It 
follows that because the refined standard of care post Montgomery specifically demands from a 
doctor a reasonable examination of the patient before them, it may well help her to identify any 
individual circumstances which would cause the provision of certain pre-operative information to 
be detrimental to the patient’s health.  Rather than eroding the exercise of clinical judgment in 
disclosure, the subjective branch to the disclosure test may well assist doctors in constructing a 
more robust argument in favour of non-disclosure by focusing their minds towards plausible factors 
which may cause the therapeutic privilege to bite. 
 It will only be as more cases arrive before the courts that a true assessment of the operation 
of therapeutic privilege in the modern era can be made. However, medical professionals should take 
some assurance from the fact that the ruling in Montgomery is certainly not authority for suggesting 
that there is an obligation to disclose every conceivable risk and alternative to a patient if it can be 
proved that this would cause them identifiable harm.102 
 The next section of the article investigates a number of novel consent claims that have 
appeared before the courts since Montgomery, some of which seem to extend the scope of the ruling 
beyond the traditional pre-operative information type claims. 
 
Looking Further Afield: Casting the Net Wider in Consent Claims  
 
Outside the domain of childbirth litigation, there is evidence that judges in the lower courts are 
taking note of the decision in Montgomery.  In Spencer v Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust103 the 
claimant suffered complications after initially consenting to a double hernia repair.  It was not 
disputed that he consented to the initial procedure and that sufficient information was given to him 
about the common risks inherent in the surgery.104  Nevertheless, his principal complaint was that 
he was not told post-operatively that he might suffer a deep vein thrombosis or pulmonary 
embolism as a result of the surgery.  Unfortunately, shortly after the surgery, he developed bilateral 
pulmonary emboli.  It fell to the judge to determine whether or not there was a breach of duty in 
failing to provide the patient with sufficient verbal and written information before his discharge as 
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to the signs and symptoms of deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism.105 He decided in 
favour of the claimant. 
 To give credit to Collender J, he was not impressed by the argument that any obligation to 
provide pre-discharge information about non-material risks would transfer the entire discharge 
process in the sense that it would take around thirty minutes to appraise the patient of all the 
relevant possibilities and thus create an unworkable administrative burden.106  In this case the judge 
seemed very much on message in recognising what Montgomery advocated in terms of assessing 
things from the point of view of the patient.  It was identified that the information could have been 
given relatively easily and practically and that it could have been provided verbally or via an 
information leaflet.107  What was even more encouraging, however, was Collender J’s attitude 
towards the NICE guidelines regarding precisely what should be told to different groups of patients 
upon discharge.  In clinical negligence cases there is a danger in treating professional guidelines as 
a “gold standard” when it comes to assessing the question of breach, but the indication from 
Collender J was that he was prepared to look beyond them in the circumstances. Regardless of what 
the guidelines stated, he considered that modern, safe and responsible medical practice ought to 
dictate that a warning about deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism be given. Whilst the 
materialisation of the risks may well be rare in many cases, to warn of the signs and symptoms is a 
“precaution that can save lives and should be given”.108  This evidences an approach that assesses 
the significance of risks from the correct angle of severity of consequence instead of predominantly 
by rate of occurrence.  The need for judges to remain aware of this has been stressed,109 but it does 
not always happen and so the attitude adopted here ought to be commended. 
 Interestingly, the issue of central importance in Spencer was post-operative information as 
opposed to pre-operative information.  Even though it was identified that the decision in 
Montgomery was not squarely on point, it seemed to be accepted that the newly defined standard of 
care was likely to be applied to all aspects of information disclosure.110  In order to facilitate this, 
Collender J undertook to reframe the Montgomery test of pre-operative materiality to a test for post-
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operative materiality that asked the question: “would the ordinary sensible patient be justifiably 
aggrieved not to have been given the information at the heart of this case when fully appraised of 
the significance of it?”111  Semantic variation aside, this seems sensible and an accurate account of 
the Supreme Court’s message in Montgomery, although it does raise a question worthy of note.   
 If the risks of deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism were significant enough that 
they ought to have been disclosed post-operatively, why were they not classified as being so pre-
operatively for the purposes of obtaining a sufficiently informed consent prior to the surgery? 
Collender J was aware of this apparent inconsistency but dismissed it on the basis that “different 
considerations” were in play post-operatively.  Pre-operatively the information would have been 
about a remote risk, whereas post-operatively information was about signs and symptoms of a 
potentially fatal condition that could be remedied if effectively diagnosed.112  
 Whatever the merits of the reasoning elsewhere, it is difficult to understand how information 
that ought to have been provided post-operatively could be classified as having been significant, 
when the same information was not categorised as such pre-operatively.  If the patient had been 
provided with the information before the procedure, not only would he have been alerted to the 
risks, signs and symptoms of deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism, and the need to seek 
urgent medical attention should any of these occur, but he would also have been provided with the 
information at a point when he was arguably less vulnerable and possibly more cognisant, having 
not yet endured the trauma of a surgical procedure.  This is to say nothing of the fact that the 
information pre-operatively was also crucial in order that the patient could weigh any risks in the 
balance and offset them against the benefits, thereby providing him with the opportunity to make an 
informed choice as to whether or not, in the circumstances, the level of risk involved in the 
operation was within his margin of acceptability.  It follows that the difference in timing of when 
any information is given should not ordinarily be capable of transforming once insignificant 
information into then significant; the information remains significant throughout. 
 Most traditional allegations of negligence in this field turn on the disclosure of information 
about a particular procedure or any reasonable alternatives and, as we have seen, this now seems to 
apply to both pre-operative and post-operative information. However, what about where the 
allegation is concerned not with insufficient disclosure about risks, benefits and alternatives 
inherent in a particular procedure, but on the failure to disclose that a particular surgeon may not in 
fact be the person that eventually performs the operation? 
                                                 
111 Spencer v Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 1058 at [68]. 
 
112 Spencer v Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 1058 at [77]. 
 
Law Quarterly Review Revised Submission  Page 25 of 32 
 In Jones v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust113 the patient suffered from 
recurrent back pain and it was proposed that she should undergo bilateral decompression surgery.  
The operation did not go well, and she was left with debilitating injures as a result of damage which 
occurred to her Cauda Equina.  She alleged, inter alia, that she was only told on the day of her 
surgery that the consultant who would be performing her procedure was in fact a different surgeon 
from that which she expected.  Thus, had she been informed in a timely manner about this change in 
medical personnel, she claimed that she would not have consented to the procedure and would have 
waited for the more experienced and reputable consultant to become available.114  Blunt Q.C., 
sitting as a Recorder, found for the patient on this point, and also on the question of causation.115  It 
was accepted that informing the patient that her expected consultant would not be performing the 
operation just before she was about to go into theatre effectively removed the scope for any 
voluntary choice on her part. The patient was denied a crucial piece of information which would 
have affected her decision had it been provided at a point in proceedings where she could digest it 
and use it as part of a decision making process. Even though she was technically given the 
information prior to the procedure, only being given it at that late stage meant that her decision was 
not a decision that was freely taken.116  Blunt Q.C. reasoned that denying the patient the information 
infringed “her right to make an informed choice as to whether, and if so when, and by whom to be 
operated on”.117   He was therefore prepared to look beyond the one-dimensional approach to 
information disclosure cases in which the focus is primarily on the disclosure of risks in a particular 
operation, to promote a standard of disclosure that encompasses openness and transparency 
throughout the entire medical consultation process.  The extent to which it is common practice for a 
named surgeon to be replaced by a colleague in the performance of an operation is conjecture, but if 
it is a frequent occurrence then this ruling could have a significant impact, not only in terms of the 
provision of surgery itself, but also in respect of the frequency of these types of claim. Either way, 
this is a clear example of the potentially far-reaching effect of a renewed judicial appetite for 
protecting patient rights, which may well have been influenced by Montgomery. 
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 However, it is not all good news for patients in the post-Montgomery era.  Beyond the 
sphere of negligence, there is some evidence that the patient-oriented reasoning applied elsewhere 
has limits.  In Connolly v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust118 the claimant brought an action for 
damages for personal injuries and consequential loss arising from the performance of an angiogram.  
She asserted that before the treatment was carried out the hospital staff negligently failed to obtain 
her consent and that, during the course of a second procedure, the medical staff failed to abort the 
operation when she requested that they do so. Thus, its continuation amounted to a battery.119  The 
claimant was unsuccessful.   
In stark contrast to his earlier approach in Spencer,120 Collender J did not apply the principle 
in Montgomery with the same amount of conviction when it came to determining the significance or 
otherwise of the information that was provided to the patient beforehand for the negligence element 
to this case.  There was little if any consideration of whether the consultant omitted to discuss 
material information in the pre-operative consultations with the patient, and it was also admitted 
that an information sheet given to the patient was misleading.121  Nevertheless, it was held that this 
did not vitiate consent.122  For the purposes of battery, if the information sheet was held to have 
informed the patient in broad terms about the nature of the procedure intended, and the patient then 
agreed to the operation, admittedly the consent would have been valid for the purposes of 
discharging liability. 123  Yet, regardless, surely when this aspect of the claim was framed in 
negligence a question should have been asked along the lines of: “would the reasonable patient in 
the patient’s position have considered the misleading information significant to her decision making 
process, or, whether the doctor was aware or should reasonably have been aware that the particular 
patient would have considered the misleading information significant to her decision making 
process?”  Questions such as these were not asked and the patient’s argument under the negligent 
heading was dismissed with relative ease. 
 The subsequent allegation was that at a certain point in proceedings the patient withdrew her 
consent.  Ostensibly, then, the legal principles are governed by the law of battery.  Initially the 
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patient consented to an angiogram that was to be performed by the radial approach. When 
difficulties were encountered in this method the consultant changed tack and attempted an 
angiogram by the femoral route.  It was claimed by the patient that she withdrew consent just before 
an attempt was made to carry out the procedure via the femoral method, and that a dissection of the 
left main stem artery, which ultimately caused the damage of which she complained, only occurred 
after that point.124   
 Here it becomes evident that the case represents a confusion of pleadings, and indeed of 
legal reasoning.  Collender J seemed to intimate that the key question was when the dissection of 
the artery took place, thus fixating on whether the harm occurred before or after the femoral 
approach was undertaken.125  Equally, some consideration seemed to be given to what the patient 
would have done had she been asked, hypothetically, to agree to the procedure that she had 
allegedly withdrawn consent to, and whether, had the procedure been aborted, the outcome would 
have been different.126  Questions as to the injury sustained and but-for causation are of course 
relevant to negligence where the gist of the action is harm, but battery is actionable per se and 
therefore the key question ought to have been much more straightforward.  Ordinarily consent is 
decision-specific so unless the terms of the initial consent were framed tightly enough so as to 
authorise such further treatments as the doctor thought fit, the initial agreement to the first 
procedure ought not to have justified the second.127  The correct line of inquiry would therefore 
have been to ask: at any point before the commencement of, or during the course of, the second 
procedure, did the patient withdraw her consent? If she did, and if the consultant proceeded 
regardless, then a tortious battery was committed.128  The only justifications for continuing the 
treatment at that point would have been if the patient had lost consciousness and the procedure 
became a medical emergency, in which case resolving the emergency would have been justified on 
the basis of necessity,129 or, if the patient remained conscious but lost capacity, in which case the 
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procedure could have been administered provided it was in the patient’s best interests.130  On the 
facts, it was held that the patient did not withdraw consent, did lack capacity and that the second 
procedure did in fact become an emergency.131 However, when reading the judgment in its entirety, 
one cannot help but feel that these important questions were not given the attention that they 
deserved given the judges comments that they were largely academic given his finding in relation to 
the timing of the dissection of the artery.132 
 Either way the case demonstrates the manifest disadvantage that the patient is placed at 
when they attempt to assert that they have withdrawn consent.  Midway through a procedure they 
will undoubtedly be anxious, under tremendous stress, and if they do instruct a surgeon to stop it 
will almost always be the patient’s word against the host of medical professionals’ word involved in 
the operation.  This will also be at a point when the patient is at their most vulnerable. English law 
has held that it is for the claimant to prove a lack of consent and so it stands to reason that patients 
will always be left facing an uphill task in having to discharge the legal and evidential burden when 
their claim is that they have actually withdrawn consent midway through a procedure.133  In theory 
all a doctor need do is remain silent and invite the patient to attempt to prove their case, which it 
will be nigh on impossible to do. In light of this, where there is a purported withdrawal of consent 
one might reasonably argue that the burden of proof should shift to the doctor to establish, on the 
balance of probabilities, a continuing and valid consent on the part of the patient and that it should 
not be left to the patient to have to prove that they in fact withdrew their consent.134  This would 
mean that where a claim of withdrawal is raised by the patient, the onus should then switch to the 
doctor to introduce evidence that is at least worthy of convincing a judge, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the consent was continuing and valid, and this would need to be something more 
than simply asserting that “there was no indication to the contrary on the part of the patient”.  
Obliging a doctor to respond to an allegation of withdrawal with a greater degree of evidential 
persuasion may go someway towards redressing the disparity in position between doctor and patient 
mid operation and may at least act as a trigger for a more thorough examination from a judge of a 
scenario that currently creates an unfair bias towards doctors at the expense of patients. 
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 What is clear from the above though is that there is some evidence that the ripple-effect of 
Montgomery has not (yet) reached every component of negligent disclosure, nor has it penetrated 
into the depths of tortious battery.  It is therefore impossible to say with any degree of certainty that 
patients’ interests will always be prioritised in judicial reasoning and the impact of the decision, at 
least in a legal sense, has limits.  What then is the potential impact of the judgment beyond the law 
and how, if at all, will it affect clinical disclosure practices at the coalface? 
 
The Interplay Between Law and Professional Ethics: Disclosure Practices in the Future  
 
As we mention above, the Supreme Court in Montgomery essentially replicated the GMC guidelines 
and sought to quell anxiety about its new test by arguing that it was nothing that was not already 
required of doctors.  What this does is render the legal standard equivalent to the ethical standard.  
As with so much else with Montgomery, it is not clear whether it is intended that the ethical 
standard is to be replicated to the extent that the law will be formally identical to the GMC 
guidance.  Lords Reed and Kerr held that the Supreme Court was proposing a “broadly similar 
approach” to the GMC, but this was provided as a counter-argument to the claim that doctors would 
not have time to implement Montgomery’s requirements in practice.135  If we are to interpret their 
Lordships’ judgment in this way, then the ethical and legal standards have become the same.  Even 
if we do not do so, then at the very least they are seen by the Supreme Court as “broadly similar” 
and therefore influenced by them.  Irrespective of whether we support the change to the Rogers test 
of materiality – and we have made it clear here that we do – this is to be regretted. 
 Previously, medical law and the GMC guidance enjoyed what we considered to be a fruitful 
and well-structured relationship.  This is because there existed a clear difference between the two 
standards.  The law imposed a minimum standard that patients would be entitled to: any failure to 
achieve this standard would result in legal sanctions. 136  Before Montgomery, this was the 
“reasonable patient” test developed in Pearce and approved by the House of Lords in Chester.  
Meanwhile, the medical profession aspired to more.  As we have noted above, and as the Supreme 
Court noted in Montgomery, the GMC required a far more personalised approach to risk disclosure 
based on partnership, communication and dialogue.  It was, and remains, a significant and 
demanding standard to expect of doctors.  Thus, doctors are required to inform patients according to 
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each individual patient’s “wishes, needs and priorities”.137  Moreover, doctors must provide patients 
with all of the information that they “want or need”.138 
 However, we would argue that the law requiring such a standard would not be a positive 
development.  Rather, we believe that the gap between the legal standard and the ethical standard 
was a positive development, and one that should have remained.  In short, in our view it should be 
possible for a doctor to be acting unethically, and thus face sanction by the GMC, but not 
unlawfully.  The latter, we feel, should be limited to serious breaches of patient autonomy.  The 
“heavy boots” of the law are not required in every case, but only those where professional 
regulation is insufficient.139  Moreover, aligning the law to the professional obligations leaves one at 
the mercy of the other.  On the one hand, if the Supreme Court’s intention is to follow the ethical 
standard, then the law will rely on that standard remaining high and prioritising patient autonomy.  
On the other, if the purpose is to force the GMC to maintain its current requirements at least – as 
they cannot be relaxed without the professional standard then being less demanding than the law, 
which would not be reasonable – then the law will have essentially performed a takeover of the 
professional ethical standard. 
 In fact, the real significance of the Supreme Court’s decision may lie not in risk disclosure, 
but be felt by medical law as a whole.  This is because the taking of control by the law has been 
advertised, as Lady Hale made clear, as applying to all non-medical issues.  She held that: 
“once the argument departs from purely medical considerations and involves value judgments 
of this sort, it becomes clear, as Lord Kerr and Lord Reed conclude at para 85, that the Bolam 
test, of conduct supported by a responsible body of medical opinion, becomes quite 
inapposite”.140 
While it is undeniable that Bolam has been in retreat over the past two decades,141 this remains a 
significant statement by her Ladyship.  Bolam is not only emblematic of, but also the mechanism by 
which, medical law had deferred decision-making to the medical profession.  If medical law were to 
consciously become patient-facing, Bolam would have to be tackled directly.  This is what Lady 
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Hale and the rest of the Supreme Court did in Montgomery.  Lady Hale’s definition of when Bolam 
would apply owes much, it would seem, to the work of Ian Kennedy and his notion that doctors 
should only make decisions that they are qualified to make, and that much of what medical law 
allows doctors to do goes beyond that.  Thus: 
 
“[d]octors make decisions about what is to be done. Some, but only some, of these decisions 
are matters of technical skill. I submit that the majority of decisions taken by doctors are not 
technical. They are, instead, moral and ethical. They are decisions about what ought to be 
done, in light of certain values”.142
 
 
What Lady Hale is saying – explicitly – is that a doctor-oriented legal test will only be applicable 
when the issue to be decided is medical in nature.  Risk disclosure does not relate to technical 
medical skill, and therefore the use of Bolam is inappropriate.  Perhaps ironically, this “new” vision 
of medical law can be traced back not just to Kennedy in 1981, but also to the view of risk 
disclosure championed by Lord Scarman in Sidaway in 1985.  Lady Hale can be said to have gone 
back to the future.  
 What is clear in Montgomery is that the Supreme Court has authorised the usurpation of 
medical ethics by the law.  Professional ethics, by their very nature, relate to the duties of the doctor 
and are necessarily doctor-facing.  Yet Montgomery shifts the focus to a patient oriented medical 
law that has prioritised patients’ rights; in particular the right to autonomy.  As we mention above, 
we fully support the patient-facing test adopted by the Supreme Court, but regret the effect that this 
has on the interplay between medical law and ethics in relation to risk disclosure, which has hitherto 
worked very well. 
 
Conclusions  
 
In Montgomery, the Supreme Court’s intention was clearly twofold: to clarify the law, and to 
cement the shift in medical law’s direction towards a more patient-oriented framework.  It certainly 
achieves the latter, although we would have reservations about the former.  While we certainly 
agree with the new test for the materiality of risk, we have argued above that in four key areas the 
law relating to informed consent remains lacking in detail.  It will be up to later courts to fill in the 
gaps and, as we have demonstrated, there does not yet seem to be consensus regarding how to 
proceed on the part of lower court judges.  For our part, we see Montgomery more as a way of 
thinking rather than any detail that it might provide (other than the new definition of the materiality 
of risk).  The approach taken by the Supreme Court is the same as that adopted by the House of 
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Lords in Chester v Afshar, and indeed the High Court of Australia in Rogers vWhitaker.  This 
entails identifying the purpose of the law as being the protection of autonomy, and assessing the 
current legal regime to see if it meets these aims.  In all three of these cases a majority of judges 
found that it did not, and so modified the law to adequately protect autonomy.  This is obviously 
necessarily patient-oriented, and looks at issues from the perspective of the patient’s rights rather 
than the doctor’s duties.  Again, we are in full agreement with this development.  Future courts 
should look at the approach of the House of Lords and now Supreme Court, and consider cases in 
the same way: does the current law adequately protect patient autonomy and, if not, what needs to 
be changed to allow it to do so?  They should feel particularly emboldened to do so following Lady 
Hale’s assertion that Bolam should only apply to medical issues and decisions.  Moreover, this is a 
general approach that transcends the specific facts of Montgomery and can apply to any non-
technical area of medical law.  Thus, even if it is possible to question the factual conclusions that 
the Supreme Court came to,143 we agree with Kennedy that many decisions taken by doctors that 
find their way to court – such as risk disclosure, removal of life support and the sterilisation of 
adults with learning disabilities – are not medical in nature, then the courts are indeed free to 
impose themselves and the values that they feel that medical law should espouse. 
 Yet the danger with this is that medical ethics becomes squeezed out of medical law.  As we 
argue above, risk disclosure before Montgomery contained a positive relationship between medical 
law and ethics, where the two worked in tandem.  The Supreme Court has dismantled this structure, 
and the legal and ethical standards are now in effect identical.  This is to be regretted, and if such a 
trend continues then judges will find themselves effectively the arbiters of medical ethics as well as 
medical law.  Should this be the case, then we are also entitled to apply Kennedy’s querying of 
unique competence to the judiciary: what makes them more qualified than anyone else to make 
ethical decisions?  Some will argue that their role as judges mean that they do have the expertise, 
while others may feel otherwise.  What we do know, however, is that the decision of the Supreme 
Court both leaves many issues in risk disclosure open and clears the way for increased judicial 
intervention in ethical matters.  It promises to be a busy next few years for medical lawyers. 
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